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Board of Education of teh Hendrick Hudson Central

the legislative history indicates that a handicapped child should
receive, not just an adequate education, but one that will enable
the child to achieve his maximum potential; and (3) compliance with
a state plan is not itself enough to guarantee compliance with
federal standards.
As the discussion below indicates, the decision below
appears to be wrong.
~

The SG argues against taking the case on the

ground that it will have limited precedential value.

Despite the

CA2's attempts to limit the precedential scope of its decision, I
think future courts will have trouble seeing the case as irrelevant

2.

to cases before them (I will explain this in more detail below) .
Another reason for not taking the case would be that there is as yet
no split.

In the context of a decision such as this one, however,

there may be little need to wait for more wrongly-decided cases.

I

would therefore recommend a grant.
1.

FACTS:

In the decision below, the CA2 upheld a DC

decision ordering a school to

v'

for a deaf child.

In his excellent dissent,

demonstates that the school made extraordinary efforts to do what
would be best for the child and only decided against an interprete

----

-

after repeated observations of her classroom behavior when she had

-

an..___
interpreter:

these observations (made by several experts in

several different classroom situations) revealed that she resisted
interpretation, watched the speaker rather than the interpreter, and
asked the speaker to repeat anything she could not understand.

A

specialist in teaching children with hearing impairments, who was
Amy's language tutor, testified on the basis of working closely with
Amy daily that a sign language interpreter would not make a
significant difference in Amy's education but would, on the
contrary, deter her interactions with her teacher and other children
in the classroom.

This evidence was corrobated by a hearing

therapist who worked with Amy three times a week for a half-hour
each session.

In light of this evidence, the school district

concluded that, at least for the time being, she did not need a
constant interpreter in addition to the many supplemental services
she was receiving.

3.

2.

u.s.c.

§§

ANALYSIS:

The Education for the Handicapped Act, 20

1401-1461 provides that cooperating states are to have a

plan approved (by the Sec'y of HEW) providing free appropriate
public education to handicapped children.

The plan must also

provide procedures for challenges to the education provided a
handicapped child, and the final administrative decisions can be
challenged de novo in DC.
The DC held that a sign-language interpreter had to be
~

provided.

:::::.:.

He stated that the Act did not define "appropriate

education" and concluded that the term meant services necessary "to
bring her educational opportunity up to the level of the educational
opportunity being offered to her non-handicapped peers."

This, the

DC decided, meant a sign-language interpreter during all academic
~

courses.

---

.....,

Actually, the act does define "free appropriate

education":

public~

special education and related servies at public

___.,

expense, under public supervision and direction, including an
appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in
the State and in conformity with the individualized education
program required by the federal law.

This definition suggests that

whether a child has been deprived of his rights under an approved
plan will turn on whether he has recieved the free public education
he was entitled to under the relevant approved state plan (providing
the other requirements are met, such as the "individualized-program"
requirement) .

..;,..

_

.
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·,·,

4.

Under the approved New York plan, all children with ~
hearing losses such as Amy's are not automatically entitled to

2 1}{, ,L(.. ·~

sign-language interpreter.

~

The CA2 (Timbers and Bonsal, per curiam) affirmed over
Judge Mansfield's

The decision, which begins with
--is about Amy," is somewhat light on

powerfu ~ dj ssent.
~

the sentence "This case
reasoning.
_________,

The court agreed that Amy needed an interpreter and

affirmed the legal standard adopted by the DC:

the Act requires

~ · ....

...___...._

that level of services needed to bring her educational opportunity
up to the level offered non-handicapped children.

The CA2 did not

provide any basis for the legal conclusion (other than incorporation
by reference of the rationale below) and stated that the evidence
did not show that the factual findings were clearly erroneous. In
th~

last paragraph, it states that the holding is narrow and rests

on the concerns involved in a particular child, her atypical family
(her parents were deaf), etc., concluding with: "In short, our
decision is limited to the unique facts of this case and is not
intended as authority beyond this case."
I do not see how a purely legal holding as to the proper
standard (compliance with an approved state plan versus services
necessary to provide an educational opportunity equivalent to that
available to other children) can be distinguished in future cases on
the ground that Amy and her family are unique.

-

IL

Nor do I see how

·~
:\-

-

petr can avoid giving an interpreter to every child with a hearing
-------.._
loss regardless of the child's needs, the marginal utility of the
service, and the great cost.

-.....

/._J

~

Given the overwhelming evidence that

.

.,

5.

the an interpreter was actually undersirable in this case, few cases
will be distinguishable on the basis of these facts.
In dissent, Judge Mansfield gives other reasons for
regarding the decisions below as wrong.

For example, he explains

that evaluating a child's learning potential is an almost
impossible, and certainly controversial, task--whereas the
legislative history indicates that Congress intended to give
children the education they need to become independent, productive
members of society.

Amy is performing above average in her class

and appears to be on her way to being an independent person, capable
of functioning without a constant interpreter.
Another problem with the majority opinion is noted by the
pool memo: under it, states cannot establish a plan, get it
approved, and thereby know what expenses they will incurr if they
receive federal funds under this voluntary cooperative program.

;
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
February 20, 1981 Conference
List 5, Sheet 3
No. 80-1002
BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL.~

v.
ROWLEY
1.

SUMMARY:

-----

Cert to CA 2
{Timbers, Bonsal, D.J.;
Mansfield dissenting)
{Per Curiam)
Federal/Civil
Timely

Petrs contend that the CA and DC erred in

requiring them to provide a partially deaf s tudent with a sign
language interpreter under the Education fo r All Handicapped
~

.

Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. §1401 et
2.

child.

FACTS:

~·

{1978).

Amy Rowley is an eight yea r old partially deaf

Despite her handicap, she performs a bove the median

B~.$e.. -1-h ~t!. pr-j,...__tly t.$ ~""''~""" /,15
~IY/ .::~,t ~/./ .le.... de.rr,~ I
be.-/,~ 7 h--.Jt!!!!..c..--'~ ~
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(

standard of her class.

She has some residual hearing,

particularly in lower frequencies, and can read lips.

She also

uses an FM wireless hearing aid, which amplifies particular
sounds but blocks out background noise.
II

'

The school district

l

---....::1

provided Amy with a sign interpreter on a test basis, but the
interpreter reported that Amy resisted interpretation,
functioning like the nonhandicapped children and looking to the
teacher rather than the interpreter.
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20

The Education for All

u.s.c. §l414(a) (5) provides

that "the local educational agency •.. will establish ... an
individualized education program for each handicapped child at
the beginning of each school year •... "

Amy's parents objected

to the individualized program prepared by the school district for
Amy because it made no provision for a sign language interpreter.
The school district's decision was upheld by the Commissioner of
Education of New York, and the Rowleys commenced an action in the
Southern District of New York to compel the assignment of an
interpreter.

Prior to making the state commissioner a defendant,

the parties stipulated that the DC should review Amy's program
not only for the current year but the next year as well.

The

Rowleys contended that without assignment of an interpreter Amy
was deprived of the "free appropriate public education" which the
Act required state and local educational agencies receiving funds
under it to provide each handicapped child.

Section 1412(1) of

the Act provides: "In order to qualify for a ssistance under this
subchapter in any fiscal year, a

S~ate

shall demonstrate to the

Commissioner that the following conditions are met: {1) The State

- 3 -

r.

has in effect a policy that assures all handicapped children the
right to a free appropriate public education."
3.

v

DECISIONS BELOW:

.

The DC (Broder1ck) ruled that a "free

appropriate public education" required "that each handicapped
child be given an opportunity to achieve his full potential
commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children".
He concluded that without a sign interpreter Amy missed much of
what went on in the classroom, and concluded that the services of
an interpreter were needed "to bring her educational opportunity
up to the level of the educational opportunity being offered to
her non-handicapped peers."

The CA concluded in a brief opinion

that the DC's decision was ba~ed "on the preponderance of the

---------------...:=--

--7

evidence", §1415(e) (2).

The majority went out of its way to

emphasize the narrow scope of its holding.

(

It stated "our

decision is limited to the unique facts of this case and is not
intended as authority beyond this case. II
Judge Mansfield dissented.

He criticized the ...thf6 DC' s view

that the Act did not define "free appropriate public education."
20

u.s.c.

§1412(18) defines "free appropriate public education"

as "special education and related services which (A) have been
provided at public expense, under public supervision and
direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the
state educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool
elementary or secondary school education in the state involved,
and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized
education program required under ·§ 1414 (a) (5) of this title."

A

"special education" is defined in §1401(16) as specially designed

-

instruction to meet the "unique needs of a handicapped child,"
and "related services" is defined in §1401(17) as
· "transportation, and such developmental corrective, and other
supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology,
psychological services, physical and occupational therapy,
recreation, and medical and counselling services, except that
such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation
purposes only) as may be required to assist a hand icapped child
to benefit from special education".

According to the dissent,

the prima r y characteristics of the definition are thus meeting
the standards of an approved state plan and tailoring education
to the specific needs of the individual.

Here New York has

adopted a state plan which has been approved by the U.S.
Education Commissioner, a plan which permits development of
unique educational plans for handicapped children like Amy.
plan does not require sign intepreters.

The

Reviewing the facts,

Judge Ma nsfield concluded that the evidence clearly demonstrated
that Amy's unique needs did not require the use of a sign ·
language interpreter.

The DC simply concluded that every deaf

child fairs better in class with an interpreter, and moved from
this conclusion to Amy's case.
4.

CONTENTIONS:

The state education authorities begin by

adopting Judge Mansfield's argument that the DC erred in
substituting its own definition of free appropriate public
education for the definitions provided in the Act.

They contend

that the Act was intended to enable the hand icapped to become
functioning members of society, insofar as their handicapping

.....
'

- 5 -

conditions allow.

Its purpose was not, as the DC ruled, to

. compel school districts to provide the handicapped with the
opportunity to achieve maximum or a full potential, however
desirable that goal may be.

Petrs also stress that the CA should

have ordered dismissal of the complaint because the school
district was in conformity with the state plan approved by the
federal Commissioner..

Under the Act appropriate education is

defined by reference to approved state plans, and New York's plan
did not require assignment of interpreters.

Petrs also contend

that the DC based its decision on the perceived needs of a class
of handicapped persons, rather than the unique needs of an
individual as required by the Act.

See 20

u.s.c.

§1401(16).

Petrs then review the testimony developed below that Amy
functions perfectly well in class without a sign interpreter,
that the existence of an interpreter would actually impede Amy's
development, and injure her prospects for later life when such an
interpreter would not always be available.

Petrs also contend

that the CA and DC erred in hearing the case since it concerned
not only the plan for the current school year, developed by the
school district, but also Amy's plan for the corning school year,
not yet addressed by state authorities.

Finally, petrs

emphasized that the CA's effort to limit the precedential value
of its decision should not bar review by ceriorari.

The

definition of free appropriate public education advanced by the
DC has already been cited by several other courts in cases
arising under the Act.

See, e.g., · Battle v. Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (CA 3 1980).

·.

- 6 -

Resps stress that there is no conflict in the circuits and
· that the case, as the CA itself stressed, is highly fact
specific.

They argue that the definition in the Act relied upon

by Judge Mansfield and petrs is not a functional definition, and
that it provides no guidance to judges in their consideration

of

controversies involving the identification, evaluation, or
educational placement of the child or the provision of a free
appropriate public education.

The DC therefore did not err in

adopting the definition that it did.

Resps also reject the

exhaustion argument raised by petrs, since any approach other
than the D·c' s would not have permit ted resolution of the issue
prior to the school year
5.

DISCUSSION:

conce~ned.

I find the dissent's argument concerning

the definition of a free appropriate public education persuasive.
The Act defines the term by reference to an approved state plan,
and here New York's approved state plan did not require a sign
interpreter.

By submitting a plan and gaining its approval, New

York officials were in a position to know what obligations they
were incurring in exchange for acceptance of federal funds.
Those obligations did not include the amorphous definition of an
appropriate education adopted by the DC and upheld by the CA.

As

resps point out, however, there is no conflict in the circuits,
and the CA bent over backwards to make its affirmance fact
specific.
There is a response.

2/5/81
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CENTRAL PARKWAY
NEW YORK 11005

(212l 428·4596

'·""'·::')
_;,_;:._

I.'

'I !.J~

L.: •. '

PH 12 56

January ll, 1982
Office of the Marshal
Supreme Court of the United States
United States Supreme Court Building
l First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20543
Re:

Board of Education, Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley ,
Index No. 80-1002.

Dear Sir:
The above-entitled action is scheduled to be argued before the Court in February. I am the attorney of record for the respondents and l__:;:i~2 ~e_argt.:_!.I!g before the Court. ..1...-~~~-~al}y__J;jgaf. The purpose of this letter is to explain to
you briefly the equipment I would like to use (see the enclosed memorandum pre=
pared by the College Educational Resources Department of Ga11audet College) and
Lo ask your permission _for its use.
There are .only three possible ways to provide a deaf individual with access to
the spoken word:
(1) us~ of a sign language interpreter; (2) use of a note-taker;
or (3) use of a visual display.
I am not nearly competent enough in sigh language
Lo make use of an interpreter.
Even the best not e-taker will miss 50 percent
of what is said in the Court. The system I propose will provide me with "a continuous
English display of all voice communication in the courtroom."
If this proposal is feasible, I will be in Washington on February 5 for a demonstratiDJ.1 of the system. following the demonstration, Mr. Torr (of Gallaudet College)
and I could meet with you to discuss questions of set-up, security check, etc.
If you prefer, a representative from your office could attend the demonstration and
see the system in actual operation.
Thank you for your consideration.

Enclosure .

''

,,

'·"<"

GALLAUDET COLLEGE
KENDALL GREEN, VVASHINGTDN, D.C. 20002

RECEiVED
COLLEGE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES

January 4, 1981
,n1ce of the Vice Presiden·
MSSDIKDES

To:

Bob navil\;

From:

Don Torr

Subject:

Michael Chatoff and Real-Time Translation at Supreme Court

{/J \""""

/
1
Mr. Donald Nixon, President of Translation Systems, Inc. has
/·assured me of his readiness to provide equipment and a certified court
i
s te_nog~aph~_r to support Hr. Chat off in his- a-ppeal to the Supreme Co~rt
in February.
On January 8, 1982 Donald Nixon; Kevin Casey, Tom Klagholz,
Julian Snow, and I will meet to discuss the equipment configuration and
operation of the system which would give Mr. Chatoff a continuous English
display of all .voice conununication in the courtroom . As of this moment,
the project appears completely feasib~~Hr. Nixon has suggested that it would perhaps be best if Mr . Chatoff
were the one who ~e court for pennissi~:m~~_::;e this technology to
enable him to follow the proceedings of the court with full comprehension.
The intention would be to place a S~e~.lPe machine ~d a .CRT d~splay in
the courtroom and place the computer in the hall or some convenient space
near the courtroom . A cable would be run from the Stenotype machine to
the ~~r.
A second. cable would run~ the computer-to the dispTay
tenninal.
There would be need for access to standard electrical power for
the Stenotype machine,_ the display tenn:inal, and the computer.
It would be
necessary to have . some _time to set UE._ the system and tes~_J:..E. Uould you please
pass that suggestion to Mr. Chatoff and ask him to get back to us as soon as
possible with a reply?
I would be happy to communicate directly with
Mr. Chatoff if you think that would speed things.
I have suggested to Don Nixon that we demonstrate the system for
Hr. Chatoff using the equipment which would be installed in the court if
permission is granted and he has agreed ro that .
I certainly hope it is possible to provide this support to
Hr . Chatoff .
Jj: wo~ld be an historic event for deaf individuals and would
~~precedent for this ty~f service; it wouldlundoubtedly--pr;vide the
public with additional education about deafness; and ~t would probably_
accelerate the incorporation of this technology in the court system .

- - -.

DVT:psb:l
cc: D. H. Nixon
E. c. }lerrill, Jr.
K. B. Casey
T. J. Klagholz
J. B. Snow
J. c. Scott

No. 80-1002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES"S--:::-::::-::----·- - -

f'ECEJV :D

October Term, 1980

(
THE BOARD OF EDUCATIOO OF THE HENDRICK HUDSON
CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, WESTCHESTER COUNTY, AND
THE COMMISSIOOER OF EDUCATION OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK, PETITIONERS

ii~E OF
'11=

fhf LLER~
ro" 'T,

v.
AWl RCWLEY, ET AL.

ON PETITIONER FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNTED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT

EX PARTE MOTION TO PERMIT INTERPRETATION OF ORAL ARGUMENT
Counsel for respondents moves, ex parte, pursuant to Rule 42 of the Rules of
the Supreme Court for permission to have the oral argument before this Court
interpreted on the grounds that:
1.

Counsel for the respondents, who has conducted this litigation from its in-

ception, is deaf;
2. · Counsel for the respondents has used various methods in the lower courts to
provide him with access to oral communications, including note-takers (not very
useful) and video displays;
3.

Counsel for the respondents seeks permission to use a system, using private

equipment and facilities, arranged under the supervision of Mr. Donald Torr,
Department of College Educational Resources, Gallaudet College, and explained more
fully in this excerpt from an interoffice memorandum prepared by Mr. Torr:

2

The intention would be to place a Stenotype machine and a CRT display
in the courtroom and place the computer in the hall or some convenient space
near the courtroom. A cable would be run from the Stenotype machine to the
computer. A second cable would be run from the computer to the display
terminal. There would be need for access to standard electrical power
for the Stenotype machine, the display terminal, and the computer.
4.

A stenographer would type the oral argument using stenographic shorthand.

Everything typed by the stenographer would pass through a computer which would
convert the stenographic shorthand to written English.

The conversion would ap-

pear on the display terminal which would be in front of counsel for respondents.
The system "would give Mr. Chatoff a continuous English display of all voice communications in the courtroom;"
5.

No record of the argument will be made, written or otherwise.

If necessary,

counsel for respondents, as a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United
States, will submit to the Office of the Clerk a certification to that effect;
WHEREFORE, counsel for respondents requests permission for interpretation,
as discussed above.
Respectfully submitted,

~d~dL t/ L~/f!Jf/
Michael A. Chatoff
Counsel for Respondents
270-31M Grand Central Parkway
Floral Park, New York 11005
(212) 428-4596 (TTY)
(516) 248-1900
Dated:

Floral Park, New York
January 20, 1982

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D. C. , 20543

/~

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE

~

From:

Al Stevas

Re:

Argument in Board of Education
endrick Huds~
Central School District v. Ro e , No. 81-1001_ )

/
In the above case the Court g nted the pe-tition for
writ of certiorari on November 2, 1981, a <1 the_ca-se ~~
probably be scheduled for argument during the kiont h.-of Marc~.
I am informed that counsel for the respondent is totally deaf.
He indicates he is not competent enough in sign language to
make use of an interpreter and will be requesting permission
to use an official court stenographer whose Stenotype machine
will be tied to a computer display terminal in the Courtroom
(the computer equipment would be located outside the Courtroom) .
This would permit the court reporter to record questions and
they would be instantly displayed on the terminal so that
counsel could read the questions and then respond.
It appears from the attaehea~ondence that the
attorney is endeavoring cto set a_ precedent..Jby utilizing this
procedure in the Supreme--ecrtr:r·t , thereby making it easier for
attorneys to convince other court systems to allow this technique.
Since I believe this is a matter that would require
permission of the Chief Justice and/or the Court, I am calling
it to your attention in advance of receiving a motion from
counsel. Efforts to persuade him to have other counsel argue
the case have not been fruitful.
We recently had a group of deaf students seated in the
Courtroom during oral argument and an interpreter was allowed
to relay the argument and questions via sign language.
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March 18, 1982

MEMORANDUM TO

FERENCE

Subject:

Having previously been granted permission
by the Court, Mi
f, arguing for the respondent
in this case o March 23rd ill use a computer generated
system in ord
to "hear" uestions put to him by the
Court as well as
opposing counsel argument.
Chatoff is deaf and advises that he is not competent
enough in sign language . to make use of an interpreter.
Through the assistance of officials at
Gallaudet College, Chatoff will use a certified court
reporter who will key the questions in the standard court
reporter method into a stenorette machine. This machine
is wired directly into a small computer which will translate the information into plain English and in turn transmit
this to a terminal at the arguing attorney lectern. The
time it takes from stenorette to computer to the terminal
is about three seconds. Thus it should take only a few
seconds after a question is asked for Chatoff to respond
(giving him time to read the question) .
Chatoff and the assisting group from Gallaudet
set up the equipment in 'the Courtroom on February 26th.
The translation during the test was extremely favorable.
Joseph Karlovitz, the court reporter, had excellent stenographic skills, and he will also be present to assist
Chatoff during argument.
When asked how he would know if a question
was being asked while he was speaking, Chatoff said
co-counsel would tug his coat and he would then look at
the terminal and read the question.

·.

-2From the test it appears that the use of the
computer equipment will be much faster and more accurate
than the use of sign language or hand written notes.
A back-up computer is promised and every
effort for technical redundancy has been offered. It
therefore appears that the argument should proceed as
"normal" as .possible. The Conference however, should be
aware that Mr. Chatoff has a speech impediment which may
require close attention for comprehension.
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JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents a question of statutory interpretation. ~ 1 C/-- ,
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals and the Dis- ~
trict Court misconstrued the requirements imposed by Con- /
(
gress upon States which receive federal funds under the Edu.ro 4h 6 0
cation for All Handicapped Children Act. We agree and ~~.-~- 1
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
~r~---

tp'i::(

#

I

a-~

The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975/.2.. ~
(Act), 20 U. S. C. § 1401 et seq., provides federal money toR1i;;;;f _ ~- .L. ~ ~- .
assist state and local agencies in educating handicapped chil~
dren, and conditions such funding upon a State's complianc~ ~ ~
with extensive goals and procedures. The Act represents an
~
• . _ _(}
ambitious federal effort to promote the education of hand~-)"_, .
1
capped children, and was passed in response to Congres ':5'"~
perception that a majority of handicapped -children in the ~
0 ·
United States "were either totally excluded from schools or
A!_.~•.:~
[were] sitting idly in regular classrooms awaiting the time~- ---,-0
when they were old enough to 'drop out."' H.R. Rep. No. ~4/lf/( S
94--332, p. 2 (1975). The Act's evolution and major prov~ ~

1

(~/;23)~

t-t..b-K~~~

~+\.~~'
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sions shed light on the question of statutory interpretation
which is at the heart of this case.
Congress first addressed the problem of educating the
handicapped in 1966 when it amended the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 to establish a grant program "for the purpose of assisting the States in the initiation,
expansion, and improvement of programs and projects ...
for the education of handicapped children." Pub. L. No.
89-750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1204 (1966). That program was repealed in 1970 by the Education for the Handicapped Act,
Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175, Part B of which established
a grant program similar in purpose to the repealed legislation. Neither the 1966 nor the 1970 legislation contained
specific guidelines for state use of the grant money; both
were aimed primarily at stimulating the States to develop
educational resources and to train personnel for educating
the handicapped. 1
Dissatisfied with the progress being made under these earlier enactments, and spurred by two district court decisions
holding that handicapped children should be given access to a
public education/ Congress in 1974 greatly increased federal
funding for education of the handicapped and for the first
time required recipient States to adopt "a goal of providing
full educational opportunities to all handicapped children."
Pub. L. 9~80, 88 Stat. 579, 583 (1974) (the 1974 statute).
The 1974 statute was recognized as an interim measure only,
adopted "in order to give the Congress an additional year in
See S. Rep. No. 94-168, p. 5 (1975); H.R. Rep. No. 94-332, pp. 2-3
(1975).
2
Two cases, Mills v. Board of Education of the District of Columbia,
348 F. Supp. 866 (DC 1972), and Pennsylvania Association for Retarded
Children v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (1971),
343 F. Supp. 279 (ED Pa 1972), were later identified as the most prominent
of the cases contributing to Congress' enactment of the Act and the statutes which preceded it. H.R. Rep. 94-332, supra, at 3-4. Both decisions
are discussed in Part III of this opinion, infra.
1
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which to study what if any additional Federal assistance
[was] required to enable the States to meet the needs of
handicapped children." H.R. Rep. No. 94-332, supra, p. 4.
The ensuing year of study produced the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975.
In order to qualify for federal financial assistance under the
Act, a State must demonstrate that it "has in effect a policy
that assures all handicapped children the right to a free aQ~~te .J?EQ.lic~du~ion." 20 U. S. C. § 1412(1). That
po 1cymust be reflected in a state plan submitted to and approved by the Commissioner of Education, 3 § 1413, which describes in detail the goals, programs, and timetables under
which the State intends to educate handicapped children
within its borders. § 1412, 1413. States receiving money
under the Act must provide education to the handicapped by
priority, first "to handicapped children who are not receiving
an education" and second to handicapped children . . . with
the most severe handicaps who are receiving an inadequate
education," § 1412(3), and "to the maximum extent appropriate" must educate handicapped children "with children who
are not handicapped." § 1412(5). 4 The Act broadly defines
"handicapped children" to include "mentally retarded, hard of
hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seri3
All functions of the Commissioner of Education, formerly an officer in
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, were transferred to
the Secretary of Education in 1979 when Congress passed the Department
of Education Organization Act, 20 U. S. C. § 3401 et seq. See 20 U. S. C.
§ 3441(a)(1).
• Despite this preference for "mainstreaming" handicapped childreneducating them with nonhandicapped children-Congress recognized that
regular classrooms simply would not be a suitable setting for the education
of many handicapped children. The Act expressly acknowledges that "the
nature or severity of the handicap [may be] such that education in regular
classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily." § 1412(5). The Act thus provides for the education of
some handicapped children in separate classes or institutional settings.
See i bi d.; § 1413(a)(4).
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ously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, [and]
other health impaired children, [and] children with specific
learning disabilities." § 1401(1). 5
The "free appropriate public education" required by the
Act is tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped child
by means of an "individualized educational rogram" (IEP).
§ 1401(18). The
P, which 1s prepare a a mee ing between a qualified representative of the local educational
agency, the child's teacher, the child's parents or guardian,
and, where appropriate, the child, consists of a written document containing
"(A) a statement of the present levels of educational
performance of the child, (B) a statement of annual
goals, including short-term instructional objectives, (C)
a statement of the specific educational services to be provided to such child, and the extent to which such child
will be able to participate in regular educational programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such service, and (E) ~ objective criteria and evaluation procedures arurSchedules
for determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional objectives are being achieved." § 1401(19).
Local or regional educational agencies must review, and
where appropriate revise, each child's IEP at least annually.
§ 1404(a)(5). See also §§ 1413(a)(ll), 1414(a)(5).
In addition to the state plan and the IEP already described, the Act im oses exten ·v
ocedural re uirements
upon States receiving fede al funds under 1ts prov1s1ons.
Paren s or guardians of an icapped children must be notified of any proposed change in "the identification, evaluation,
& In addition to covering a wide variety of handicapping conditions, the
Act requires special educational services for children "regardless of the severity of their handicap. " §§ 1412(2)(C), 1414(a)(l)(A).

.. .
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or educational placement of the child or the provision of a free
appropriate public education to the child," and must be per- .
mitted to bring a complaint about "any matter relating to"
such evaluation and education. § 1415(b)(l)(D) and (E). 6
Complaints brought by parents or guardians must be resolved at "an impartial due process hearing," and appeal to
the State educational agency must be provided if the initial
hearing is held at the local or regional level. § 1415(b)(2) and
(c). 7 Thereafter, "[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and
decisions" of the state administrative hearing has "the right
• The requirements that parents be permitted to file complaints regarding their child's education, and be present when the child's IEP is formulated, represent only two examples of Congress' effort to maximize parental involvement in the education of each handicapped child. In addition,
the Act requires that parents be permitted "to examine all relevant records
with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of
the child, and .. . to obtain an independent educational evaluation of the
child." § 1415(b)(1)(A). See also §§ 1412(4), 1414(a)(4). State educational policies and the state plan submitted to the Commissioner of Education must be formulated in "consultation with individuals involved in or
concerned with the education of handicapped children, including handicapped individuals and parents or guardians of handicapped children."
§ 1412(7). See also § 1412(2)(E). Local agencies, which receive funds
under the Act by applying to the state agency, must submit applications
which assure that they have developed pro~ures for "the participation
and consultation of the parents or guardian [s] f [handicapped] children"1
in local educational programs, § 1414(a)(1)(C) m), and the application itself,
along with "all pertinent documents related to such application," must be
made "available to parents, guardians, and other members of the general
public." § 1414(a)(4).
7
"Any party" to a state or local administrative hearing must
"be accorded (1) the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel and by
individuals with special knowledge or training with respect to the problems
of handicapped children, (2) the right to present evidence and confront,
cross examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses, (3) the right to a
written or electronic verbatim record of such hearing, and (4) the right to
written findings of fact and decisions." § 1415(d).
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to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint . . . in any
State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of
the United States without regard to the amount in controversy." § 1415(e)(2).
Thus, although the Act leaves to the States the primary
responsibility for developing and executing educational programs for handicapped children, it imposes significant requirements to be followed in the discharge of that responsibility. Compliance is assured by provisions permitting the
withholding of federal funds upon determination that a participating state or local agency has failed to satisfy the requirements of the Act, §§ 1414(b)(2)(A), 1416, and by the provision for judicial review. At pres·ent, all States except New
Mexico receive federal funds under the portions of the AcCat
issu; today. -Bri~(f~ thelJnited States as Amicus Curiae
2, n. 2.
II
This case arose in connection with the education of Amy
Rowley, a deaf student at the Furnace Woods School in the
Hendrick Hudson Central School District, Peekskill, New
York. Amy has minimal residual hearing and is an excellent
lipreader. During the year before she began attending Furnace Woods, a meeting between her parents and school administrators resulted in a decision to place her in a regular
kindergarten class in order to determine what supplemental
services would be necessary to her education. Several members of the school administration prepared for Amy's arrival
by attending a course in sign-language interpretation, and a
teletype machine was installed in the principal's office to facilitate communication with her parents who are also deaf.
At the end of the trial period it was determined that Amy
should remain in the kindergarten class, but that she should
be provided with an FM hearing aid which would amplify
words spoken into a wireless receiver by the teacher or fellow students during certain classroom activities. Amy successfully completed her kindergarten year.
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As required by the Act, an IEP was prepared for Amy during the fall of her first-grade year. The IEP provided that
Amy should be educated in a regular classroom at Furnace
Woods, should continue to use the FM hearing aid, and
should receive instruction from a tutor for the deaf for one
hour each day and from a speech therapist for three hours
each week. The Rowleys agreed with the IEP but insisted
that Amy also be rovided a qualified sign-Ian a iiir pre~er m all of her aca em1c c asses.
uc an interpreter
had been placed in Amy's kindergarten class for a two-week
experimental period, but the interpreter had reported that
Amy did not need his services at that time. The school administrators likewise concluded that Amy did not need such
an interpreter in her first-grade classroom. They reached
this conclusion after consulting the school district's Committee on the Handicapped, which had received expert evidence
from Amy's parents on the importance of a sign-language interpreter, received testimony from Amy's teacher and other
persons familiar with her academic and social progress, and
visited a class for the deaf.
When their request for an interpreter was denied, the
Rowleys demanded and received a hearing before an independent examiner. After rece1vmg evidence from both
sides, the examiner agreed with the administrators' determination that an interpreter was not necessary because
"Amy was achieving educationally, academically, and socially" without such assistance. App. to Pet. for Cert. F -22.
The examiner's decision was affirmed on appeal by the New
York Commissioner of Education on the basis of substantial
evidence in the record. !d., at E-4. Pursuant to the Act's
provision for judicial review, the Rowleys then brought an
action in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, claiming that the administrators' denial of the sign-language interpreter constituted a denial of
the "free appropriate public education" guaranteed by the
Act.
The District Court found that Amy "is a remarkably well-
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adjusted child" who interacts and communicates well with
her classmates and has "developed an extraordinary rapport"
with her teachers. 483 F. Supp. 528, 531. It also found
that "she performs better than the average child in her class
and is advancing easily from grade to grade," id., at 534, but
"that she understands considerably less of what goes on in
class than she would if she were not deaf" and thus "is not
learning as much, or performing as well academically, as she
would without her handicap," id., at 532. This disparity between Amy's achievement and her potential led the court to
decide that she was not receiving a "free appropriate public
education," which the court defined as "an opportunity to
achieve [her] full potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children." I d., at 534. According to
•
the District C.o.yrt, such a ~rd "requires that the poten- f) <( ...S
tial oTthe handicapped child be measured and comg.a,red to ~
his or her performance, and that the remaining differential or
'snortfalPl>e comRared to the shortfall experienced by nonhandicapped c ildren. ' bi .
e 1stnct ourt's definition arose from its assumption that the responsibility for
"giv[ing] content to the requirement of an 'appropriate education' " had "been left entirely to the federal courts and the
hearing officers." I d., at 533. 8
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed.
The Court of Appeals
"agree[d] with the [D]istrict [C]ourt's conclusions of law,"
and held that its "findings of fact [were] not clearly erroneous." 632 F. 2d 945, 94 7 (1980).
8
For reasons that are not revealed in the record, the District Court concluded that "[t]he Act itself does not define 'appropriate education.'" 483
F. Supp., at 533. In fact, the Act expressly defines the phrase. See
§ 1401(18). After overlooking the statutory definition, the District Court
sought guidance not from regulations interpreting the Act, but from regulations promulgated under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See 483
F. Supp., at 533, citing 45 CFR § 84.33(b).
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We granted certiorari to review the lower courts' interpretation of the Act. 454 U. S. - - (1981). Such review requires us to consider two questions: What is meant by the
Act's requirement of a "free appropriate public education"?
And what is the role of state and federal courts in exercising
the review granted by§ 1415 of the Act? We consider these
questions separately. 9
III
A
This is the first case in which this Court has been called
upon to interpret any provision of the Act. As noted previously, the District Court and the Court of Appeals concluded
that "[t]he Act itself does not define 'appropriate education,'"
483 F. Supp., at 533, but leaves "to the courts and the hearing officers" the responsibility of "giv[ing] content to the requirement of an appropriate education." Ibid. See also 632
F. 2d, at 947. Petitioners contend that the definition of the
phrase "free appropriate public education" used by the courts
below overlooks the definition of that phrase actually found in
the Act. Re~on_£ents a~e that the Act defines "free..approE_riate public ~d~ation,' but contend thatthe ;t"atutory
defi~ional" and thus "offers judges no guid-

~

~.f ~
~-

'

~

• The IEP which respondents challenged in the District Court was ere- _ ~
J
•
ated for the 1978-1979 school year. Petitioners contend that the District ~
Court erred in reviewing that IEP after the school year had ended and before the school administrators were able to develop another IEP for subsequent years. We disagree. Judicial review invariably takes more than
nine months to complete, not to mention the time consumed during the preceding state administrative hearings. The District Court thus correctly
ruled that it retained jurisdication to grant relief because the alleged deficiencies in the IEP were capable of repetition as to the parties before it yet
evading review. Rowley v. The Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District, 483 F. Supp. 536, 538 (1980). See Murphy v.
Hunt, 455 U.S.--,-- (1982); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147,
149 (1975).
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ance in their consideration of controversies involving the
'identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the
child or the provision of a free appropriate public education.'"
Brief for Respondents 28. The United States, appearing as
amicus curiae on behalf of respondents, states that "[a]lthough the Act includes definitions of 'free appropriate public
education' and other related terms, the statutory definitions
do not adequately explain what is meant by 'appropriate."'
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13.
We are loath to conclude that Congress failed to offer any
assistance in defining the meaning of the principal substantive phrase used in the Act. It is beyond dispute that, contrary to the conclusions of the courts below, the Act does expressly define "free appropriate public education":
"The term 'free appropriate public education' means special education and related services which (A) have been
provided at public expense, under public supervision and
direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of
the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate
preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in
the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity
with the individualized education program required
under section 1414(a)(5) of this title." § 1401(18) (emphasis added).
"Special education," as referred to in this definition, means
"specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents or
guardians, to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child,
including classroom instruction, instruction in physical education, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions." § 1401(16). "Related services" are defined as
"transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and
other supportive services ... as may be required to assist a
handicapped child to benefit from special education."
§ 1401(17). 10
10

Examples of "related services" identified in the Act are "speech pathol-
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Like many statutory definitions, this one tends toward the
cryptic rather than the comprehensive, but that is scarcely a
reason for abandoning the quest for legislative intent.
Whether or not the definition is a "functional" one, as respondents contend it is not, it is the principal tool which Congress has given us for parsing the critical phrase of the Act.
We think more must be made of it than either respondents or
the United States seems willing to admit.
According to the definitions contained in the Act, a "free
appropriate public education" consists of educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to
permit the child "to benefit" from t~e instruction. Almost as
a checklist for adequacy under the Act, the definition also requires that such instruction and services be provided at public expense and under public supervision, meet the State's
educational standards, approximate the grade levels used in
the State's regular education, and comport with the child's
IEP. Thus, if personalized instruction is being provided
with sufficient supportive services to permit the child to benefit from the instruction, and the other items on the definitional checklist are satisfied, the child is receiving a "free appropriate public education" as defined by the Act.
Other portions of the statute also shed light upon con essiona m en . Congress
e roug y e1g t million hanaiCapped children in the United States at the time of
enactment, one million were "excluded entirely from the public school system" and more than half were receiving an
inappropriate education. Note to § 1401. In addition, as
mentioned in Part I, the Act requires States to extend educational services first to those children who are receiving no
ogy and audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, and medical and counseling services, except that such
medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only."
§ 1401(17).
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education and second to those children who are receiving an
"inadequate education." § 1412(3). When these express
statutory findings and priorities are read together with the
Act's extensive procedural requirements and its definition of
"free appropriate public education," the face of the statute
evinces a congressional intent to bring previously excluded
handicapped children into the public education systems of the
States and to require the States to adopt procedures which
would result in individualized consideration of and instruction
for each child.
~
1
Noticeably absent from the language of the statute is any
!ubstantive standard prescribing the level of education to be
accorded handicapped children. Certainly the language of
the statute contains no requirement like the one imposed by
the lower courts-that States maximize the potential of
handicapped children "commensurate with the opportunity
provided to other children." 483 F. Supp., at 534. That
standard was expounded by the District Court without reference to the statutory definitions or even to the legislative history of the Act. Although we find the statutory definition of
"free appropriate public education" to be helpful in our interpretation of the Act, there remains the question of whether
the legislative history indicates a congressional intent that
such education meet some additional substantive standard.
For an answer, we turn to t~ .
B
(i)

As suggested in Part I, federal support for education of the
handicapped is a fairly recent development. Before passage
of the Act some States had passed laws to improve the educational services afforded handicapped children, 11 but many of
these children were excluded completely from any form of
11
See H.R. Rep. No. 94-332, supra, at 10; Note, The Education of All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Mich. J. L. Ref. 110, 119 (1976).

...
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public education or were left to fend for themselves in classrooms designed for education of their nonhandicapped peers.
The House Report begins by emphasizing this exclusion and
misplacement, noting that millions of handicapped children
"were either totally excluded from schools or [were] sitting
idly in regular classrooms awaiting the time when they were
old enough to 'drop out."' H.R. Rep. No. 94-332, supra, at
2. See also S. Rep. No. 94-168, p. 8 (1975). One of the
Act's two princi al sponsors in the Senate urged its passage
in similar erms:
"While much progress has been made in the last few
years, we can take no solace in that progress until all
handicapped children are, in fact, receiving an education.
The most recent statistics provided by the Bureau of
Education for the Handicapped estimate that . . . 1. 75
million handicapped children do not receive any educational services, and 2.5 million handicapped children are
not receiving an appropriate education." 121 Cong.
Rec. 19486 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
This concern, stressed repeatedly throughout the legislative history, 12 confirms the impression conveyed by the language of the statute: By passing the Act, Congress sought
primarily to make public education available to handicapped
children. But in seeking to provide such access to public
education, Congress did not impose upon the States any
greater substantive educational standard than would be necessary to make such access meaningful. Indeed, Congress
See, e. g., 121 Cong. Rec. 19494 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Javits) ("all too
often, our handicapped citizens have been denied the opportunity to receive an adequate education"); 121 Cong. Rec. 19502 (1975) (remarks of
Sen. Cranston) (millions of handicapped "children are largely excluded
from educational opportunities that we give to our other children"); 121
Cong. Rec. 23708 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Mink) ("handicapped children
. . . are denied access to public schools because of a lack of trained
personnel").
'

2
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expressly "recognize[d] that in many instances the process of
providing special education and related services to handicapped children is not guaranteed to produce any particular
outcome." S. Rep. No. 94-168, supra, at 11. Thus, the intent of the Act was more to open the door of public education
to handicapped children on awropria!& terms than to guarantee any particular level of education once ms1oe.
Both the House and the Senate reports attribute the impetus for the Act and its predecessors to two federal court judgments rendered in 1971 and 1972. As the Senate Report
states, passage of the Act "followed a series of landmark
court cases establishing in law the right to education for all
handicapped children." S. Rep. · No. 94-168, supra, at 6. 13
The first case, Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (PARC), 334 F.
Supp. 1257 (1971), 343 F. Supp. 279 (ED Pa 1972), was a suit
on behalf of retarded children challenging the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute which acted to exclude them
from public education and training. The case ended in a consent decree which enjoined the State from "deny[ing] to any
mentally retarded child access to a free public program of
education and training." 334 F. Supp., at 1258 (emphasis
added).
PARC was followed by Mills v. Board of Education of the
District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (DC 1972), a case in
which the plaintiff handicapped children had been excluded
from the District of Columbia public schools. The court's
judgment, quoted at page 6 of the Senate Report on the Act,
provided
"[t]hat no [handicapped] child eligible for a publicly
supported education in the District of Columbia public
13
Similarly, the Senate Report states that it was an "[i]ncreased awareness of the educational needs of handicapped children and landmark court
decisions establishing the right to education for handicapped children [that]
pointed to the necessity of an expanded federal role." S. Rep. No. 94-168,
supra, at 5. See also H.R. Rep. No. 94-332, supra, at 2-3.
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schools shall be excluded from a regular school assignment by a Rule, policy, or practice of the Board of Education of the District of Columbia or its agents unless
such child is provided (a) adequate alternative educational services suited to the child's needs, which may include special education or tuition grants, and (b) a constitutionally adequate prior hearing and periodic review
of the child's status, progress, and the adequacy of any
educational alternative." 348 F. Supp., at 878 (emphasis added).

Mills and Pl!fiC both held that handicapped children must J2..-t!- ~
be giVen access to an aaequate, publicly supported education. ~
Neither case purports to require ·any particular substantive ~
level of education. 14 Rather, like the language of the Act, ~ . ~ ~. ~~ .7:,
the cases set fqr_th ext~nsive procedu~s to be followed in for- ~~____.
mlllating personalizedeaUcational programs for handicapped -; - ' · ~ · children. See 348 F. Supp., at 878-883; 334 F. Supp., at ~
1258-1267. 15 The fact that both PARC and Mills are dis- ~~

n

ad-

"If sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services and programs that are needed and desirable in the system then the available funds
must be expended equitably in such a manner that no child is entirely excluded from a publicly supported education consistent with his needs and
ability to benefit therefrom. The inadequacies of the District of Columbia
Public School System whether occasioned by insufficient funding or administrative inefficiency, certainly cannot be pennitted to bear more heavily
on the 'exceptional' or handicapped child than on the nonnal child." !d., at
876.
15
Like the Act, PARC required the State to "identify, locate, [and] evaluate" handicapped children, 334 F. Supp. , at 1267, to create for each child
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cussed at length in the legislative reports 16 suggests that the
principles which they established are the principles which, to
a significant extent, guided the drafters of the Act. Indeed,
immediately after discussing these cases the Senate R~rt
describes the 1974 statute as having "incorporated themajor
principles of the right to education cases." S. Rep. No
94-168, supra, at 8. Those principles in turn became the
basis of the Act, which itself was designed to effectuate the
purposes of the 1974 statute. H.R. Rep. No. 94-332, supra,
at 5. 17
an individual educational program, id., at 1265, and to hold a hearing "on
any change in educational assignment," iff., at 1266. Mills also required
the preparation of an individual educational program for each child. In addition, Mills permitted the child's parents to inspect records relevant to
the child's education, to obtain an independent educational evaluation of
the child, to object to the IEP and receive a hearing before an independent
hearing officer, to be represented by counsel at the hearing, and to have
the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, all of which are
also permitted by the Act. 348 F. Supp., at 879-881. Like the Act, Mills
also required that the education of handicapped children be conducted pursuant to an overall plan prepared by the District of Columbia, and established a policy of educating handicapped children with nonhandicapped children whenever possible. Ibid.
16
See S. Rep. No. 94-168, supra, at 6-7; H.R. Rep. No. 94-332, supra,
at 3-4.
n The 1974 statute "incorporated the major principles of the right to education cases," by "add[ing] important new provisions to the Education of
the Handicapped Act which require the States to: establish a goal of providing full educational opportunities to all handicapped children; provide
procedures for insuring that handicapped children and their parents or
guardians are guaranteed procedural safeguards in decisions regarding
identification, evaluation, and educational placement of handicapped children; establish procedures to insure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children ... are educated with children who are not
handicapped; ... and establish procedures to insure that testing and evaluation materials and procedures utilized for the purposes of classification
and placement of handicapped children will be selected and administered so
as not to be racially or culturally discriminatory." S. Rep. No. 94-168,

t
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That the Act imposes no clear obligation upon recipient
States beyond the requirement that handicapped children receive some form of specialized education is perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that Congress, in explaining the need
for the Act, equated an "appropriate education" to the receipt of some specialized educational services. The Senate
Report states: "[T]he most recent statistics provided by the
Bureau of Education for the Handicapped estimate that of
the more than 8 million children . . . with handicapping conditions requiring special education and related services, only
3. 9 million such children are receiving an appropriate education." S. Rep. No. 94-168, supra, at 8. 18 This statement,
which reveals Congress' view that 3. 9 million handicapped
children were "receiving an appropriate education" in 1975, is
followed immediately in the Senate Report by a table showing that 3. 9 million handicapped children were "served" in
supra, at 8.
The House Report explains that the Act simply incorporated these purposes of the 1974 statute: the Act was intended "primarily to amend ...
the Education of the Handicapped Act in order to provide permanent authorization and a comprehensive mechanism which will insure that those
provisions enacted during the 93rd Congress [the 1974 statute] will result
in maximum benefits for handicapped children and their families." H.R.
Rep. No. 94-332, supra, at 5. Thus, the 1974 statute's purpose of providing handicapped children access to a public education became the purpose
of the Act.
18
These statistics appear repeatedly throughout the legislative history of
the Act, demonstrating a virtual consensus among legislators that 3.9 million handicapped children were receiving an appropriate education in 1975.
See, e. g., 121 Cong. Rec. 19486 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams); 121
Cong. Rec. 19504 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Schweicker); 121 Cong. Rec.
23702 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Madden); 121 Cong. Rec. 23702 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Brademas); 121 Cong. Rec. 23709 (1975) (remarks of Rep.
Minish); 121 Cong. Rec. 37024 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Brademas); 121
Cong. Rec. 37027 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Gude); 121 Cong. Rec. 37417
(1975) (remarks of Sen Javits); 121 Cong. Rec. 37420 (1975) (remarks of
Sen. Hathaway).
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1975 and a slightly larger number were "unserved." A similar statement and table appear in the House Report. H.R.
Rep. No. 94-332, supra, at 11-12.
It is evident from the legislative history that the characterization of handicapped children as "served" referred to
children who were receiving some form of specialized educational services from the States, and that the characterization
of children as "unserved" referred to those who were receiving no specialized educational services. For example, a letter sent to the United States Commissioner of Education by
the House Committee on Education and Labor, signed by
two key sponsors of the Act in the House, asked the Commissioner to identify the number ·of handicapped "children
served" in each State. The letter asked for statistics on the
number of children "being served" in various types of "special
education program[s]" and the number of children who were
not "receiving educational services." Hearings on S. 6 before the Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess., 205-207 (1975). Similarly, Senator Randolph, one of
the Act's principal sponsors in the Senate, noted that roughly
one-half of the handicapped children in the United States
"are receiving special educational services." I d., at 1. 19 By
9
' Senator Randolph stated: "only 55 percent of the school-aged handicapped children and 22 percent of the pre-school-aged handicapped children
are receiving special educational services." Hearings on S. 6 before the
Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1975). Although the figures differ slightly in various parts of the legislative history, the general thrust of
congressional calculations was that roughly one-half of the handicapped
children in the United States were not receiving specialized educational
services, and thus were not "served." See, e. g., 121 Cong. Rec. 19494
(1975) (remarks of Sen Javits) ("only 50 percent of the Nation's handicapped children received proper education services"); 121 Cong. Rec. 19504
(1975) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("[a]lmost 3 million handicapped children, while in school, receive none of the special services that they require
in order to make education a meaningful experience"); 121 Cong. Rec.

.

•
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characterizing the 3.9 million handicapped children who were
"served" as children who were "receiving an appropriate education," the Senate and House reports unmistakably disclose
Congress' perception of the type of education required by the
Act: an "appropriate education" is provided when personalized educational ii~ruiQ8S. are provided. w
23706 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Quie) ("only 55 percent [of handicapped children] were receiving a public education"); 121 Cong. Rec. 233709 (1975)
(remarks of Rep. Biaggi) ("[o]ver 3 million [handicapped] children in this
country are receiving either below par education or none at all").
Statements similar to those appearing in the text, which equate "served"
as it appears in the Senate Report to "receiving special educational services," appear throughout the legislative .history. See, e. g., 121 Cong.
Rec. 19492 (1975) (remarks of Sen Williams); 121 Cong. Rec. 19494 (1975)
(remarks of Sen. Javits); 121 Cong. Rec. 19496 (1975) (remarks of Sen.
Stone); 121 Cong. Rec. 19504-19505 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey);
121 Cong. Rec. 23703 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Brademas); Hearings on
H.R. 7217 before the Subcommittee on Select Education of the Committee
on Education and Labor of the House of Representatives, 94th Cong. , 1st
Sess., 91 , 150, 153 (1975); Hearings on H.R. 4199 before the Select Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Education and Labor of the
House of Representatives, 93rd Con g., 1st Sess., 130, 139 (1973). See also
45 CFR § 121a.343(b) (1980).
20
In seeking to read more into the Act than its language or legislative
history will permit, the United States focuses upon the word "appropriate," arguing that "the statutory definitions do not adequately explain
what [it means]." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 13.
Whatever Congress meant by an "appropriate" education, it is clear that it
did not mean a potential-maximizing education.
The term as used in reference to educating the handicapped appears to
have originated in the PARC decision, where the District Court required
that handicapped children be provided with "education and training appropriate to [their] learning capacities." 334 F . Supp., at 1258. The word
appears again in the Mills decision, the District Court at one point referring to the need for "an appropriate educational program," 348 F. Supp.,
at 879, and at another point speaking of a "suitable publicly-supported education," id., at 878. Both cases also refer to the need for an "adequate"
education. See 334 F. Supp., at 1266; 348 F. Supp., at 878.
The use of "appropriate" in the language of the Act, although by no
means definitive, suggests that Congress used the word as much to de-
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(ii)
Respondents contend that "the goal of the Act is to provide
each handicapped child with an equal educational opportunity." Brief for Respondents 35. We think, however, that
the requirement that a State provide specialized educational
services to handicapped children generates no additional
qUirement that the services so provided be sufficient to maximize each child's potential "commensurate with the opportu~ nity provided other children ...,.,. Responaents and1he United
{
/
States correctly notethal Congress sought "to provide assistance to the States in carrying out their responsibilties under
... the Constitution of the United States to provide equal
protection of the laws." S. Rep. ·No. 94-168, supra, at 13. 21
But we do not think that such statements imply a congressional intent to achieve strict equality of opportunity or
services.
The educational opportunities provided by our public
school systems undoubtedly differ from student to student,
depending upon a myriad of factors that might affect a particular student's ability to assimilate information presented in

re-

scribe the settings in which handicapped children should be educated as to
prescribe the substantive content or supportive services of their education.
For example, § 1412(5) requires that handicapped children be educated in
classrooms with nonhandicapped children "to the maximum extent appropriate." Similarly, § 1401(19) provides that, "whenever appropriate,"
handicapped children should attend and participate in the meeting at which
their IEP is drafted. In addition, the definition of "free appropriate public
education" itself states that instruction given handicapped children should
be at an "appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school" level.
§ 1401(18)(C). Thus, use of the word "appropriate" seems to reflect Congress' recognition that some settings are simply not suitable environments
for the participation of some handicapped children. At the very least,
these statutory uses of the word refute the contention that Congress used
"appropriate" as a term of art which concisely expresses the standard
found by the lower courts.
"See also 121 Cong. Rec. 19492 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams); 121
Cong. Rec. 19504 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
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the classroom. The requirement that States provide "eql_!al"
educational opportunities would thus seem to present an ene umn · ossible measuretirely unworkable stan r
ments an comparisons. Similarly, furnishing han I capped
ch~ such services as are available to nonhandicapped children would in all probability fall short of the statutory requirement of "free appropriate public education"; to
require, on the other hand, the furnishing of every special
service necessary to maximize each handicapped child's potential is, we think, further than Congress intended to go.
Thus to speak in terms of "equal" services in one instance
gives less than what is required by the Act and in another
instance more. The theme of the Act is "free appropriate
public education," a phrase which is too complex to be captured by the word "equal" whether one is speaking of opportunities or services.
The legislative conception of the requirements of equal protection was undoubtedly informed by the two district court
decisions referred to above. But cases such as Mills and
P ARC held simply that handicapped children may not be excluded entirely from public education. In Mills, the District
Court said:
"If sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the
services and programs that are needed and desirable in
the system then the available funds must be expended
equitably in such a manner that no child is entirely excluded from a publicly supported education consistent
with his needs and ability to benefit therefrom." 348 F.
Supp., at 876.
The PARC Court used similar language, saying "[i]t is the
commonwealth's obligation to place each mentally retarded
child in a free, public program of education and training appropriate to the child's capacity.... " 334 F. Supp., at 1260.
The right of access to free public education enunciated by
these cases is significantly different from any notion of abso-
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lute equality of opportunity regardless of capacity. To the
extent that Congress might have looked further than these
cases which are mentioned in the legislative history, at the
time of enactment of the Act this Court had held at least
twice that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require States to expend equal financial
resources on the education of each child. San Antonio
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1975); Mcinnis v.
Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (ND Ill. 1968), affd sub nom,
Mcinnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 322 (1969).
In explaining the need for federal legislation, the House
Report noted that "no congressional legislation has required
a precise guarantee for handicapped children, i. e. a basic
floor of opportunity that would bring into compliance all
school districts with the constitutional right of equal protection with respect to handicapped children." H.R. Rep. No.
94-332, supra, at 14. Assuming that the Act was designed
to fill the need identified in the House Report-that is, to
provide a "basic floor of opportunity" consistent with equal
protection-neither the Act nor its history persuasively demonstrate that Congress thought that equal protection required anything more than e ual access. Therefore, Congress' desire to provide s ecialize e uca 10nal serv1 s even
m u erance o equality,' cannot be read as im osin an
pa 1cu ar su s an 1ve e uca 10na standard upon the States.
'rhus, the D1stnct Court and the Court of Appeals erred
when they held that the Act requires New York to maximize
the potential of each handicapped child commensurate with
the opportunity provided nonhandicapped children. Desirable though that goal might be, it is not the standard that
Congress imposed upon States which receive funding under
the Act. Rather, Congress sought primarily to identify and
evaluate handicapped children, and to provide them with access to a free public education.
(iii)
Implicit in the congressional purpose of providing access to

.

'
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a "free appropriate public education" is the requirement that
th,e education to which access is provided be sufficient to confer some educational benefit u on the handica ed child. It
woul o Itt e goo or ongress to spend millions of dollars
in providing access to a public education only to have the
handicapped child receive no benefit from that education.
The statutory definition of "free appropriate public educatiQn, "in adaition to requiring that StaTes pro viae eaCh child
with "specially designed instruction," expressly requires the
provision of "such ... supportive services ... as rna 1e required to assist a handicapped child o ene t from s_necial
education." § 1401(17). We therefore conclude thatthe
"basic floor of opportumty" provided by the Act consists of
access to specialized instruction and services from which a
handicapped child can obtain"some educational benefit'~ 22
22
This view is supported by the congressional intention, frequently expressed in the legislative history, that handicapped children be enabled to
achieve a reasonable degree of self sufficiency. After referring to statistics showiilg that many handicapped children were excluded from public
education, the Senate Report states:
"The long range implications of these statistics are that public agencies and
taxpayers will spend billions of dollars over the lifetimes of these individuals to maintain such persons as dependents and in a minimally acceptable
lifestyle. With proper education services, many would be able to become
productive citizens, contributing to society instead of being forced to remain burdens. Others, through such services, would increase their independence, thus reducing their dependence on society." S. Rep. No.
94-168, supra, at 9. See also H.R. Rep. No. 9W32, supra, at 11.
Similarly, one of the principal Senate sponsors of the Act stated that "providing appropriate educational services now means that many of these individuals will be able to become a contributing part of our society, and they
will not have to depend on subsistance payments from public funds." 121
Cong. Rec. 19492 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams). See also 121 Cong.
Rec. 25541 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Harkin); 121 Cong. Rec. 3702W7025
(1975) (remarks of Rep. Brademas); 121 Cong. Rec. 37027 (1975) (remarks
of Rep. Gude); 121 Cong. Rec. 37410 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Randolph);
121 Cong. Rec. 37416 (1975) (remarks of Sen Williams).

I
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The 9/termination of
children are re- 1 1
ceiving 'sufficient educational benefit§ to satisfy the require-..
~
ments of the Act presents a more difficult problem. The Act
~·
requires participating States to educate a wide spectrum of
handicapped children, from the marginally hearing-impaired
~
to the profoundly retarded and palsied. It is clear tha~ the
_ ,~
1. _ o
benefits obtainable b children at one end of t he spectrum
~
will differ dramatically om those obtainable y c 1 r n at
~J _ • • 1_ J.- \
~_,
[ th~ other en , With m mte vanations in oetween. One child
may have little difficulty competing successfully in an academic setting with nonhandicapped children while another
child may encounter great difficulty in acquiring even the
most basic of self-maintenance skills. We do not attempt today to establish any one test for determining the adequacy of
~ _
_
educational benefits conferred upon all children covered by
~
the Act. Rather, because in this case we are presented wit.hu
~ child capable of bei"Rg e<Jy~ated i'R the regYlar classrooms of
~.fe..tj(
_a public school system, we confine our analysis to th~t
. 1 _ /?~~ __ .
situation.
l"""'bl ~"--"7 I"
The Act requires participating States to educate handi- A .J~- _ _J _
capped children with nonhandicapped children whenever pos- ,__..~

f

The desire to provide handicapped children with an attainable degree of
personal independence obviously anticipated that state educational programs would confer educational benefits upon such children. Bll~ at the
same time, the goal of achieving/ (ome degree of self sufficienc r ' n most
cases is a good deal more modest t an e po en 1a -maximizi g goal
adopted by the lo~er courts.
id the dissent in
Despite its frequent mention, we can
the Court of Appeals that self sufficienc was itself the substantive stan !!rd which Congress imposed upon the States. Because many m1 y
handicapped children will achieve self sufficiency without state assistance
while personal independence for the severely handicapped may be an unreachable goal, "self sufficiency" as a substantive standard is at once an inadequate protection and an overly demanding requirement. We thus view
these references in the legislative history as evidence of Congress' intention ~at the services provided handicapped children bl~ducationally bene;
ficial, whatever the nature or severity of their handicap.

-
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sible. 23 When that "mainstreaming" preference of the Act
has been met and a child is being educated in the regular
classrooms of a public school system, the system itself monitors the educational progress of the child. Regular examinations are administered, grades are awardedl and yearly advancement to higher grade levels is permitted for those
children who attain an adequate knowledge of the course material. The grading and advancement system thus serves as
a determinant of educational benefit. Children who graduate from our public school systems are considered by our society to have been "educated" at least to the grade level they
have completed, and access to an "education" for handicapped
children is precisely what Congress sought to provide in the
Act. Thus, handicapped children who have been placed by1
the State in regular classrooms of the public education system, and who are achieving passing marks and advancing
from grade to grade, are rece1vmg the substantive educational benefits anticipated by the Act.

c
When the language of the Act and its legislative history are
considered together, the requirements imposed by Congress
become tolerably clear. Insofar as a State is required to provide a handicapped child with a "free appropriate public education," we hold that it satisfies this regui!:_ement b~QYid
ing perso8ahzed instructwp With sufficient support sgrvices
to permit the child to benefit educationatry from that inst
2:1 Section 1412(5) of the Act requires that participating States establish
"procedures to assure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children, including children in public or private institutions or other
care facilities, are educated with children who are not handicapped, and
that special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of handicapped
children from the regular educational environment occurs only when the
nature or severity of the handicap is such that education in regular classes
with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily."

~QA/.f{)

.

H~

~~--
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tion. Such instruction and services must be provided at public expense, must meet the State's educational standards,
must approximate the grade levels used in the State's regular
education, and must comport with the child's IEP. In addition, the IEP, and therefore the personalized instruction,
should be formulated in accordance with the requirements of
the Act and, if the child is being educated in the regular classrooms of the public education system, should be reasonablJ_T )
calculated t
the child to achieve assin marks anq
a
ce om grade to grade. 24
IV
A
As mentioned in Part I, the Act permits "[a]ny party ag24
In defending the decisions of the District Court and the Court of Ap- '
peals, respondents and the United States rely upon isolated statements in
the legislative history concerning the achievement of maximum potential,
see H.R. Rep. No. 94-332, supra, at 13, as support for their contention
that Congress intended to impose greater substantive requirements than
we have found. These statements, however, are too thin a reed on which
to base an interpretation of the Act which disregards both its language and
the balance of its legislative history. "Passing references and isolated
phrases are not controlling when analyzing a legislative history." Department of State v. The Wash ington Post Co.,-- U. S. - - (1982).
Moreover, even were we to agree that these statements evince a congressional intent to maximize each child's potential, we could not hold that
Congress had successfully imposed that burden upon the States.
"[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply
with federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Congress' power to
legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract.' . . . Accordingly,
if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it
must do so unambiguously." Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451
u. s. 1, 17 (1981).
As already demonstrated , the Act and its history impose no requirements
on the States like those imposed by the District Court and the Court of
Appeals. A fortiori Congress has not done so unambiguously, as required
in the valid exercise of its spending power.

'

'
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grieved by the findings and decision" of the state administrative hearings "to bring a civil action" in "any State court of
competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United
States without regard to the amount in controversy."
§ 1415(e)(2). The complaint, and therefore the civil action,
may concern "any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision
of a free appropriate public education to such child."
§ 1415(b)(l)(E). In reviewing the complaint, the Act provides that a court "shall receive the record of the [state] administrative proceeding, shall hear additional evidence at the
request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall.grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate. '~ § 1415(e)(2).
The parties disagree sharply over the meaning of these
provisions, petitioners contending that courts are given only
limited authority to review for state compliance with the
Act's procedural requirements and no power to review the
substance of the state program, and respondents contending
that the Act requires courts to exercise de novo review over
state educational decisions and policies. We find petitioners'
contention unpersuasive, for Congress expressly rejected
provisionstliat woiii<fhave so severely restricted the role of
reviewing courts. In substituting the current language of
the statute for language that would have made state administrative findings conclusive if supported by substantial evidence, the Conference Committee explained that courts were
to make "independent decision[s] based on a preponderance
of the evidence." S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-455, supra, at 50.
See also 121 Cong. Rec. 37416 (1975) (remarks of Sen
Williams).
But although we find that this grant of authority is broader
than claimed by petitioners, we think the fact that it is found
in § 1415 of the Act, which is entitled "Procedural Safeguards," is not without significance. When the elaborate
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and highly specific procedural safeguards embodied in § 1415
are contrasted with the general and somewhat imprecise substantive admonitions contained in the Act, we think that the
importance Congress attached to these procedural safeguards cannot be gainsaid. It seems to us no exaggeration
to say that Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon
compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a
large measure of participation at every stage of the administrative process, see, e. g. § 1415(a}-(d), as it did upon the
measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantive
standard. We think that the Congressional emphasis upon
full participation of concerned parties throughout the development of the IEP, as well as the requirements that state
and local plans be submitted to the Commissioner for approval, demonstrate the legislative conviction that adequate
compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most
cases assure much if not all of what Con ess wished in the
way o su stantive content in an IEP.
Thus the provision that a reviewing court base its decision
on the "preponderance of the evidence" is ~y no means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own nobo~s of souna
chool authorities which
educational olic for
t ey reyjew, The very importance which Congress has attached to compliance with certain procedures in the preparation of an IEP would be frustrated if a court were permitted
simply to set state decisions at nought. The fact that
§ 1415(e) requires that the reviewing court "receive the
records of the [state] administrative proceedings" carries
with it the implied requirement that due weight shall be
given to these proceedings. And we find nothing in the Act
to suggest that merely because Congress was rather sketchy
in establishing substantive requirements, as opposed to procedural requirements for the preparation of an IEP, it intended that reviewing courts should have a free hand to impose substantive standards of review which cannot be
derived from the Act itself. In short, the statutory authori-
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zation to grant "such relief as the court determines is appropriate" cannot be read without reference to the obligations,
largely procedural in nature, which are imposed upon recipient States by Congress.
Therefore, a court's ~iry in suits brought under
§ 1415(e)(2) is twofold. ~. has the State complied with
the procedures set forth in the Act? 25 An~ is the individualized educational program developea-fh~ough the
Act's procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to
receive educatiomif benefits? 26
If these requirements are
met, the State has complied With the obligations imposed by
Congress and the courts can require no more.
B
In assuring that the requirements of the Act have been
met, courts must be careful to void im osing their view of
prefera e e uc 10na methods upon the States. 27 Tne primary r~ty Tor formllratmg tneeducation to be accorded a handicapped child, and for choosing the educational
method most suitable to the child's needs, was left by the Act
to state and local educational agencies in cooperation with the
This inquiry will require a court not only to satisfy itself that the State
has adopted the state plan, policies, and assurances required by the Act,
but also to determine that the State has created an IEP for the child in
question which conforms with the requirements of§ 1401(19).
26
This second .I)W of the inquiry wjl! be satisfied in cases such as this one
by a showin that
· ·
assin marks and is advancing
om grade to grade.. See Part III, supra.
27
In this case, for example, both the state hearing officer and the District
Court were presented with evidence as to the best method for educating
the deaf, a question long debated among scholars. See Large, Special
Problems of the Deaf Under the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975, 58 Washington U. L. Q. 213, 229 (1980). The District Court
accepted the testimony of respondents' experts that there was "a trend
supported by studies showing the greater degree of success of students
brought up in deaf households using [the method of communication used by
the Rowleys]." 483 F. Supp., at 535.
25
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parents or guardian of the child. The Act expressly charges
States with the responsibility of "acquiring and disseminating
to teachers and administrators of programs for handicapped
children significant information derived from educational research, demonstration, and similar projects, and [of] adopting, where appropriate, promising educational practices and
materials." § 1413(a)(3). In the face of such a clear statutory directive, it seems highly unlikely that Congress intended courts to overturn a State's choice of appropriate educational theories in a proceeding conducted pursuant to
§ 1415(e)(2). 28
We previously have cautioned that courts lack the "specialized knowledge and experience" n~cessary to resolve "persistent and difficult questions of educational policy." San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 42 (1973).
We think that Congress shared that view when it passed the
Act. As already demonstrated, Congress' intention was not
that the Act displace the primacy of States in the field of education, but that States receive funds to assist them in extending their educational systems to the handicapped. Therefore, once a court determines that the requirements of the
Act have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution by the States.

v
Entrusting a child's education to state and local agencies
does not leave the child without protection. Congress
sought to protect individual children by providing for parental involvement in the development of State plans and poli2ll It is clear that Congress was aware of the States' traditional role in the
formulation and execution of educational policy. "Historically, the States
have had the primary responsibility for the education of children at the elementary and secondary level." 121 Cong. Rec. 19498 (1975) (remarks of
Sen. Dole). See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968)
("[b]y and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control
of state and local authorities").

'.
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cies, supra, at - - and n. 6, and in the formulation of the
child's individual educational program. As the Senate Report states:
"The Committee recognizes that in many instances the
process of providing special education and related services to handicapped children is not guaranteed to produce any particular outcome. By changing the language
[of the provision relating to individualized educational
programs] to emphasize the process of parent and child
involvement and to provide a written record of reasonable expectations, the Committee intends to clarify that
such individualized planning conferences are a way to
provide parent involvement · and protection to assure
that appropriate services are provided to a handicapped
child." S. Rep. No. 94-168, supra, at 11-12. See also
S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-445, p. 30 (1975); 45 CFR
§ 121a.345 (1980).
As this very case demonstrates, parents and guardians will
not lack ardor in seeking to ensure that handicapped children
receive all of the benefits to which they are entitled by the
Act. 29
29

In addition to providing for extensive parental involvement in the formulation of state and local policies, as well as the preparation of individual
educational programs, the Act ensures that States will receive the advice
of experts in the field of educating handicapped children. As a condition
for receiving federal funds under the Act, States must create "an advisory
panel, appointed by the Governor or any other official authorized under
State law to make such appointments, composed of individuals involved in
or concerned with the education of handicapped children, including handicapped individuals, teachers, parents or guardians of handicapped children, State and local education officials, and administrators of programs
for handicapped children, which (A) advises the State educational agency
of unmet needs within the State in the education of handicapped children,
[and] (B) comments publicly on any rules or regulations proposed for issuance by the State regarding the education of handicapped children."
§ 1413(a)(12).
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VI
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the District Court. Neither the District Court nor
the Court of Appeals found that petitioners had failed to comply with the procedures of the Act, and the findings of neither court would support a conclusion that Amy's educational
program failed to comply with the substantive requirements
of the Act. On the contrary, the District Court found that
the "evidence firmly establishes that Amy is receiving an 'adequate' education, since she performs better than t~ average child in her_cl~ss andis aav~ncmg easiTy from grade to
grade." 483 F. Supp., at 534. In light of this finding, the
lower courts should not have concluded that the Act requires
services beyond those provided by the Furnace Woods school
administrators. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 30

So ordered.

30
Because the District Court declined to reach respondents' contention
that petitioners had failed to comply with the Act's procedural requirements in developing Amy's IEP, 483 F. Supp. , at 533, n. 8, the case must
be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Dear Bill,
I
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tentatively,
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and

other

will

way,

attempt

a

at

dissent

this case, which I find quite difficult.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
cpm

least
in
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05/18/82
Memorandum to Justice Powell
Re:

I

Rowley

am sympathetic with your general reaction that Justice

Rehnquist reaches the correct result in this case, but by means of a
standard that may not be appropriate for other cases.

Your concur-

ring draft, however, does raise two questions in my mind.
1

First, is the standard used by the DC impossibly incorrect?
On reflection, I wonder if it really is.

"An opportunity to achive

full potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other
children" focuses first on a child's potential, not on an absolute
level of performance..
tential"

has

an

For a person like Nicholaus Romeo, "full po-

extremely

1 imi ted

meaning.

Sad

to

say,

Romeo's

"full potential" may mean only the ability to perform extremely simple tasks.

For others with less severe handicaps, "full potential"

increases -- although by definition it remains less than that possessed by individuals without handicaps.

Consequently, a standard

based on "potential" is tied to the individual's own characteristics

-----------------~,
absolute level of performance.

and not any particular

very desirable attribute

for

a

This is a

standard that must apply across a

very wide range of abilities.
Moreover, the DC's "full potential" standard is qualified.
......

It applies only

to the

extent

provided to other children."

"commensurate with

___..;

the opportunity

Plainly public schools often fail to

1~
/

2.

educate normal children to 100% of their full potential.

The "com-

mensurate" clause properly should ensure that handicapped children
get no greater claim to realization of their potential.

This "com-

mensurate" standard -- correctly applied -- could provide the crucial sensitivity to educational cost that the Act needs in order to
be administrable on a sensible basis.
In
really

sum,

I

have serious doubts whether

is misconceived.

the DC' s

standard

It seems to me to offer a promising ap-

preach to an otherwise intractable statute.
I do think that the application of this standard in the DC
and the CA2 is incorrect.
the school district
education.

undertook

substantial efforts to assist Amy's

But the courts below faulted the school because Amy was

not "'learning as much •
Dr aft at 8

As WHR sets forth at 6-7 of his draft,

. as she would without her handicap.'"

(quat ing DC opinion) .

Well, of course not!

It often

will take incredible resources in effect to remove a child's handicap.

Often (as with Romeo) it is just plain impossible.

If this is

to be the test, the school board will always lose (or go broke).
Instead,

I

think

a proper application of the "potential"

standard must recognize that the performance to be expected from any
child depends on the extent of his or her handicap.

The more severe

the handicap, the lower (unfortunately) the child's potential --and
the less the absolute benefit that the child can fairly be expected
to gain from education.

In this case, I would hold that the school

district had done as much to help Amy to achieve her
tential as

(limited)

po-

it had to help children with better hearing to achieve

3.

their

(higher)

potential.

Therefore I would hold that the school

district properly had discharged its duties under the Act.
2

My second question concerns the extent of proper deference
to school planning under the Act.

Every instinct counsels against

the

in an area so much within

involvement of

federal

judges

the

sphere of school board expertise as the proper curriculum for handicapped students.

Yet it seems to me that the terms of the Act sug-

gest that Congress mandated such involvement -- on a nondeferential
basis.

The Act does provide that the records of the school board's

deliberations could be introduced before the district court.

But it

added that the court "shall hear additional evidence at the request
of a party

"

The standard of review deliberately is speci-

fied as the more intrusive "preponderance" standard.

And the feder-

al courts are instructed to "grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate."

I question how easily the plain language of

this statute can be read to mandate a "high degree of deference" to
state officials, no matter how desirable such deference might be as
a matter of sound policy.

*

*

*

I have spoken with HAB' s

*

*

clerk on this case.

HAB tenta-

tively voted to reverse in this case, and apparently is planning to
circulate comments or a concurrence in a few days.

One option for

you would be to await his comments to see if they cast any light on
the resolution of this difficult case.

I would be happy to try to

develop any thoughts expressed here if you think they hold promise.

r '

~

4.

Or you may decide I'm all wet.
caught in a rain storm!

It won't be the first time I've been
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Justice Powell concurring.
I
least

join
for

the Court's opinion,

me

satisfactory

it

is

standard

virtually
from

the

recognizing
impossible
statutory

that

-

at

to derive

definition

a
of

10

"free appropriate public education".
The Court
receive

concludes

"some"

or

that handicapped

"sufficient"

educational

satisfy the requirements of the Act.
et seq.
The

benefits

See, ante,

to

23, 24,

This level of generality affords little guidance.

basic

difficulty

participating
handicapped
impaired

children must

to

states

as
are

the

Court observes,

required

child

ranging

from

the

profoundly

the

retarded.

needs must be assessed individually.
is not possible

to

frame

a

to

is

educate

marginally
And

that
each

hearing-

each child's

Therefore it simply

standard except

15

in the most

20

2.

general terms.

Nevertheless, the District Court held, and

a divided panel of the Court of Appeals agreed, that the
term "free appropriate public education" requires a state
to provide for each handicapped child "an opportunity to
achieve

[her]

full

potential

commensurate

opportunity provided to other children."
534.

This standard

with

25

the

483 F. Supp. at

is wholly unrealistic and could not

have been intended by Congress.
to

create

such

an

educational

opportunity

for

each

30

handicapped child, regardless of the nature or degree of
the handicap.

And how can school authorities compare - in

any objective way - the "full potential" for education of
each handicapped child with that of "other children"?
The Court is wise, I think, to limit the application
of its standard to the facts of this case.
contribution of

35

The important

today's opinion is its identification of

the scope of a reviewing court's inquiry in suits brought
under Section 1415(e)
must

determine

rather

(2) of the Act.

whether

elaborate

the

Such a court first

state has

procedures,

involvement, required by the Act.

complied with

including
Secondly,

the

parental
in light of

40

3

0

the facts before it, the Court must determine whether the
"individualized educational program"
for

that

child

is

(the IEP)

"reasonably calculated

child to receive educational benefits".

developed

to enable

Ante at 29.

the

45

In a

case like Amy's, this inquiry certainly is satisfied when
the child is receiving passing marks and is advancing from
grade to grade.

~'
N 26, p.
~

29.
50

When
developed

it
an

is

shown

that

the

individualized

school

authorities

educational

program

have
in

accordance with the requirements of the Act, a reviewing
court

should

accord

approved program.

a

high

degree

of

deference

to

the
55
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AMY2 GINA-POW
Judge Mansfield,
which I

in

a

full

and

documented

largely agree, observed that this

dissent with
formulation is

"unfeasible and imposes a standard that is impractical, if
not

impossible,

to

use

as

a

means

of

evaluating

appropriateness of a handicapped child's education."

5

the
Pet.

A-18.*

10

*

Judge
Mansfield
I

"indulged

in

commented

that the district court had

understatement"

when

it

recognized

the

15 ·

difficulties in applying its own standard:

J

,j
~1

I

"The difficulty with
the standard, of
course is that it depends on a number of
different measurements which are difficult to
make.
It requires that the potential of the
handicapped child be measured and compared to
his or her performance, and that the resulting
differential or 'shortfall' be compared to the
shortfall
experienced
by
nonhandicapped
children."

20

25

the

As

opinion

Court's

makes

clear,

Congress

recognized the inherent difficulty of a precise definition
or standard when it used the term "free appropriate public
education", delegating broad authority in this respect to
state

educational

It

authorities.

therefore

30

becomes

necessary, as the the Court does in this case, to consider
the

facts

of

purpose.

each

The

case

in

1 igh t

p Srticul~

Act,

of

the

Congressional

Section

1415e

( 2) '

~~1-D~
authorizes judicial review and
the request of a party.
grant

such

Although

relief

this

is

as
a

ReY;f

additional evidence at

35

Moreover, a reviewing court may

it determines to be "appropriate".

broad grant of

judicial

review,

the

history and structure of the Act - as well as common sense
-

counsel

that a high level of deference be accorded an

individualized
authorities

educational

pursuant

to

program
the

developed

prescribed

by

40

school

procedures.

Congress could not have contemplated that federal

judges

should be free to substitute their views for those of duly
constituted educational authorites where it is clear - as
in this case - that the responsibile education authorities
have

addressed

diligence.

Amy's

needs

with

sympathy,

care

and

45 -
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As
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Court's

opinion

makes

clear,

Congress

recognized the inherent difficulty of a precise definition
or standard when it used the term "free appropriate public
education", delegating broad authority in this respect to
state

educational

It

authorities.

therefore

30

becomes

necessary, as the the Court does in this case, to consider
the

facts

purpose.

of

each

The

case

Act,

in

light

particularly

of

the

Congressional

Section

1415e

( 2) '

authorizes judicial review and here additional evidence at
the request of a party.

35

Moreover, a reviewing court may

grant such relief as it determines to be "appropriate".
Although this

is a broad grant of judicial review,

the

history and structure of the Act - as well as common sense
- counsel that a high level of deference be accorded an
individualized
authorities

educational

pursuant

to

program
the

developed

prescribed

by

40

school

procedures.

Congress could not have contemplated that federal judges
should be free to substitute their views for those of duly
constituted educational authorites where it is clear - as
in this case - that the responsibile education authorities
have

addressed

I

diligence.
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needs

with

sympathy,

care

and
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Justice Powell concurring.
The Court has
the

Education

set forth the relevant provisions of

for

All

Handicapped

Children

Act.

5

It

requires, to qualify for federal assistance, that a state
provide for
public

all handicapped children a "free appropriate

education."

20

u.s.c.

§1412(1)

This

term

is
10

defined only in §1401(18) of the Act as follows:
(18)
The
term
"free
appropriate public
education" means special education and related
services which (A) have been provided at public
expense, under public supervision and direction,
and without charge, (B) meet the standards of
the State educational agency, (C) include an
appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary
school education in the State involved, and (D)
are
provided
in
conformity
with
the
individualized education program required under
section 1414(a) (5) of this title.

Section 1414 (n) (5)
school year,

"an

established or
other
the

individualized

revised

present

no

of

the

problem

presented are

20

requires that at the beginning of each

for

required
in

educational program"

each handicapped child.

requirements of §1401 (18)
elements

15

this

-

proporting

"appropriate"
case.

the meaning of a

The

two

to

be
The

include

education,
questions

"free appropriate public

25

,&. •

education",

and

the

role

of

a

court

in exercising

the

30

review granted by §1414 of the Act.
The courts below concluded it was necessary to give
some more specific guidance -

than the provisions of the

Act itself - as to the meaning of "free appropriate public
education".

The District Court,

and a divided panel of

35

the Court of Appeals, concluded that a state is required
to provide for each handicapped child "an opportunity to
achieve

[her]

full

potential

commensurate

opportunity provided to other children."
534.
Court

with

the

483 F. Supp. at

Judge Mansfield, dissenting from the majority in the
of

Appeals,

observed

that

this

definition

40

is

"unfeasible and imposes a standard that is impractical, if
not

impossible,

to

appropriateness

of

Petition

I

A-18.

formulation

use
a

as

means

handicapped

agree

approved

a

with

below

is

of

evaluating

child's

education".

Judge Mansfield
at

least

uninformative as the language of the Act.

the

as

that

the

vague

and

This Court also

has under taken,

in its opinion today, to ascertain what

Congress

by

meant

handicapped

child.

an
It

"appropriate"
agrees

that

education
the

45

for

definition

each
or

50

standard articulated by the courts below
requiring
Ante at 21.

is

"unworkable

impossible measurements and comparsions."

The Court then states its own view:

"Implicit in the congressional purpose of
providing access to a 'free appropriate public
edcation' is the requirement that the education
to which access is provided be sufficient to
confer
some
educational
benefit
upon
the
handicapped child". Ante at 23.

55

60

The Court recognizes that determining "when" a child
is receiving "sufficient educational benefits" presents a
more

difficult problem.

state

is

required

It correctly emphasizes

"to

educate

a

that a

wide-spectrum

of

handicapped children, from the marginally hearing-impaired
to the profoundly retarded and palsied.
the

benefits

obtainable

by

children

65

It is clear that

at

one end of

the

spectrum will differ dramatically from those obtainable by
children at
between."

the other
Ante

congressional

at

end,

24.

with

The

requirement

infinite variations

Court

is

then holds

satisfied

when

that
a

in
the

70

state

provides "personalized instruction with sufficient support
services to permit the child to benefit educationally from
that

instruction."

Ante

at

25.

Again,

the

reiterates a standard of "some educational benefit".

Court

75

4.

In

my

opinion

Congress

did

not

attempt

to define

"free appropraite public education" more precisely than it
did simply because there is no satisfactory

definition.

In view of the almost infinite variety of the degree of
handicaps
children,
guidance

and
no
to

needs

for

definition

assistance

could

the educational

afford

of

handicapped

genuinely

authorities

80

helpful

responsible

for

implementing the Act or to courts authorized to review the
individualized
children.

programs

particular

for

established

It is impossible for this Act to operate in any

85

sensible way except by reliance primarily on the judgment
and

expertise

educating

the

These

authorities.
individuals

of

are

responsbile
all

children,

duly

constituted

the

boards,

under

state

and

despite

educational

committees

and
the

local

law

and
for

extraordinary

90

detail of this legislation one must assume that Congress
did

not

undertake

to

judgment of a court -

substitute

its

judgment

-

or

the

for the excercise of discretion by

the school personnel who must deal with the problems and
needs of tens of thousands of handicapped children on a
day to day basis.

This

is not to say that

the Act

is

95

Jo

standard

less.

It

is

explicitly

definitionable

section,

individualized

educational

education

related

and

clear

§1414 {a) {5),

that

program must

services;

that

under

the

required

include

these

must

the

special

meet

the

100

standards of the state educational agency; and they must
include "appropriate preschool,

elementary,

or secondary

school education".
I

note

that

definitionable
section

the

section as well as

undertakes

1414 {a) {5).

I

beyond

word

guidance

the

to

conclude,

than

legislators,

term "appropriate"

define.

"appropriate".
"reasonable",

the

in

language

the
that

§1412{1)

Cf.

therefore,

administrators,

well as courts.

in

appears

105

and

that we need not go
It

a

boards

affords

less

familiar

term
and

no

agencies

to
as

110

I think we create confusion by trying to

read more into "appropriate" than we do into "reasonable",
a

term

school

confronted
system

"appropriate"

almost

can

daily

operate

by

under

courts.
this

No
Act

public
unless

is viewed as a standard of reasonableness

under ·the circumstances pertaining to the particular child
at

the

time

the

individualized

program

is

designed

or

115

o.

annually reviewed.

The broad grant of judicial review is

to assure, primarily, that the state and local educational
authorities

comply

procedures.

Although

broadly,

including

"additional
high

strictly

the

evidence",

degreee

of

a

the

with

judicial

review

right

a

of

reviewing

deference

to

the

is

party
court

prescribed
expressed

to

introduce

should

determination

give
of

a

the

educational authorities as to the appropriateness of the
program established for the child.
Congress

intended

federal courts have

for

a

judge

jurisdiction -

and

both

state

and

to be free to second
A reviewing court

is required to base its decision on "the preponderance of
evidence"

appropriate",

in

granting

"such

125

It is unthinkable that

guess the duly constituted authorities.

the

120

relief

as

130

as

in weighing the evidence there should be a

strong presumption of

the appropriateness of

the action

taken by the school authorities.
I join the Court's judgment but not its opinion.
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ROWLEY4 SALLY-POW
I do not think "some educational benefit"
affords any more specific guidance than "appropriate
public education".

Each is a general standard that

necessarily leaves to the educational authorities, after
they have otherwise complied with the Act, the
determination of the individualized programs.

I see no

need, therefore, for any different or additional standard
from the statutory language itself.
In emphasizing that a considerable discretion
necessarily must be left to the educational authorities, I
do not suggest that the Act be viewed as providing no
mandatory guidance.

It is clear, particularly under

§§1401(18) and 1414(a) (5), that the required

2.

individualized educational program must include special
education and related services; these must meet the
standards of the state educational agency; these must be
approved by the Department of Education (John:

is this

correct?); and the state standards must include
"appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school
education.

It is to be noted that the term "appropriate"

thus appear in both §§1401 (18) and 1414 (a) (5).

I

therefore conclude that we need not go beyond the word
"appropriate" in attempting - by judicial decision to lay
down a more specific standard.

The key word "appropriate"

affords no less guidance than "reasonable", a term
familiar to legislators, administrators, boards and
agencies - as well as courts.

Indeed, I think we would

create confusion by trying to read more into "appropriate"

3.

than we do into "reasonable".

No public school system

could operate intelligently under this Act unless the
requirement of an appropriate public education be viewed
essentially as a standard of reasonableness in light of
the purposes and other requirements of this legislation.
In a school system of any size, there will be hundreds of
hand~capped

children - each with his or her own

capabilities and needs.

In establishing, and revising

annually, an individualized program for each child, a
considerable measure of discretion is essential.
I turn now to the question of judicial review.
r.• !hether wisely or not, the Act confers a broad right of
judicial review - available, in effect, to the parent or
guardian of any handicapped child.

The complaining party

has a right to introduce "additional evidence", and a

4•

court must base its decision on "the preponderance of the
evidence", and may grant "such relief as • • . is
appropriate".

Note again the use of the term appropriate.

I agree with the Court, however, that the expert judgment
of the educational authorities as to program that is
appropriate for a particular child must be given a high
degree of deference by a court.

In weighing the entire

record, a presumption of appropriateness must be accorded
the action of the school authorities.

Congress could not

have intended otherwise.
I join the Court's judgment, but no so much of
its opinion as undertakes to formulate a standard
different from that contained in the Act itself.

lfp/ss 06/02/82

Rider A, p. 1 (Rowley)

ROWl SALLY-POW
For me, the relevant questions in this case are (i)
whether we must undertake - as the courts below did - to
formulate some more specific standard than the statutory
term "appropriate public education", and (ii) the degree
of deference that a reviewing court must accord the action
of the school authorities in establishing a particular
individualized education program.
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Justice Powell concurring.
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act requires a
participating

state

to

provide

for

all

handicapped

children a "free appropriate public education."
§1412(1}

5

20

u.s.c.

This term is defined in §1401(18} of the Act as

follows:
10

(18}
The
term
"free
appropriate public
education" means special education and related
services which (A} have been provided at public
expense, under public supervision and direction,
and without charge, (B) meet the standards of
the State educational agency, (C) include an
appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary

15

school education in . the State involved, and (D)
are
provided
in
conformity
with
the
individualized education program required under
section 1414(a} (5} of this title.

20

Section 1414(n} (5} requires that, at the beginning of each
school

year,

"an

established or
other
the

individualized educational program"

revised

each handicapped child.

requirements of §1401 (18}

elements

of

an

problem in this case.
this

for

case

courts

are

below

(i}
did

be
The

-

proporting

to include

"appropriate"

education,

present no

25

For me, the relevant questions in

whether
to

we

must

formulate

undertake
some

more

-

as

the

specific

' <

standard

than

education",
reviewing

the

statutory

and

(ii)

court

must

authorities

in

the

necessary

to

degree

accord

establishing

program. ~

education

give

term

of

the
a

"appropriate
deference

action

particular

of

public
that

the

30

a

school

individualized

The courts below concluded it was

more

specific

guidance

than

the

35

provisions of the Act itself - as to the meaning of "free
appropriate public education".

The District Court, and a

divided panel of the Court of Appeals, concluded that a
state
"an

is required to provide for each handicapped child
opportunity

commensurate
children."

to

with
483

achieve

the
F.

[her]

opportunity

Supp.

at

potential

full

provided

to

Judge

534.

40

other

Mansfield,

dissenting, observed that this definition is "unfeasible
and

imposes

impossible,

a
to

standard
use

appropriateness

of

Petition
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A-18.

as
a

that
a

is
means

handicapped

agree

with

Judge

impractical,
of

if

not

evaluating

the

child's

45

education".

Mansfield

that

the

standard approved below would confuse, rather than afford
any more definitive guidance than the Act itself.
This Court also has undertaken, in its opinion today,

50

to state what Congress meant by an "appropriate" education
for each handicapped child.

It agrees that the definition

or standard articulated by the courts below is "unworkable
.•••

requiring

Ante at 21.

impossible measurements and comparsions."
55

The Court then states its own view:

"Implicit in the congressional purpose of
providing access to a 'free appropriate public
edcation' is the requirement that the education
to which access is provided be sufficient to
confer
some
educational
benefit
upon
the
handicapped child".
Ante at 23.
{Emphasis
added)

The
required
children,

Court
"to

correctly
educate

from

the

a

emphasizes

that

wide-spectrum

marginally

a

of

state

is

handicapped

hearing-impaired

"profoundly retarded and palsied".

60

to

65

the

It is clear that the

benefits obtainable by children at one end of the spectrum
will differ dramatically from those obtainable by children
at the other end, with "infinite variations in between."
Ante

at

24.

requirement

The
is

Court

satisfied

then

holds

when

a

that
state

the

70

Act's

provides

"personalized instruction with sufficient support services
to permit

the child

instruction."

to benefit educationally

Ante at 25.

from

that

Again, the Court reiterates a

standard of "some educational benefit".

75

I

do not

more

think

and

probably

"appropriate
standard

public

that

authorities,

"some educational benefit" affords any
less

specific

education".

necessarily

guidance

Each

leaves

to

is

a

the

than

general

educational

80

after they have complied otherwise with the

Act, the determination of the individualized programs.

I

see no need for any different or additional standard from
the statutory language itself.
This

leaves

educational

a

considerable

authorities,

discretion is necessary.
guidance
under

in other

§§1401 (18)

individualized
education

and

standards

of

but

the

state

in

It

is

1414 (a) (5),

educational
related

only

the

to

area

the

85

where

The Act provides quite specific

respects.
and

discretion

clear,
that

program must

services:

these

educational

particularly
the

required

include
must

agency:

special

meet
the

90

the
state

standards must include "appropriate preschool, elementary,
or

secondary school education":

plan
(John:

must

be

approved

is this correct?)

by

the

and

the state's overall

Department

of

Education

It is to be noted that the term

"appropriate" appear in both §§1401 (18) and 1414 (a) (5).

95

I therefore conclude that we need not go beyond the
word "appropriate" in attempting - by judicial decision to

lay

down

a

more

specific

The

standard.

key

word

100

"appropriate" affords no less guidance than "reasonable",
a term familiar to legislators, administrators, boards and
agencies -

as well as courts.

Indeed,

I think we would

create confusion by trying to read more into "appropriate"
than we do
could

into "reasonable".

operate

intelligently

No public

under

this

school

Act

sys tern

unless

105

the

requirement of an appropriate public education be viewed
essentially as a

standard of reasonableness

in light of

the purposes and other requirements of this legislation.
In a school system of any size, there will be hundreds of
handicapped

children

each

capabilities

and

In

annually,

an

needs.

individualized

with

his

establishing,
program

for

or

her

and

revising

each

110

own

child,

a

considerable measure of discretion is simply essential.
I

turn now to the question of judicial review.

Whether wisely or not,

the Act confers a broad right of

judicial review - available,

in effect, to the parent or

guardian of any handicapped child.

The complaining party

115

has

a

right

to

introduce · "additional

evidence",

and

a

court must base its decision on "the preponderance of the
evidence",

and

appropriate".

may

grant

"such

relief

as

120

is

Note again the use of the term appropriate.

I agree with this Court, however, that the expert judgment
of the educational authorities as to the program that is
appropriate for

a particular child must be given a high

degree of deference by a court.

125

In weighing the entire

record, a presumption of appropriateness must be accorded
the action of the school authorities.

Congress could not

have intended otherwise.
I

join Parts I,

and the judgment.

II and IVB of the Court's opinion,
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The
term
"free
appropriate
public
education" means special education and related
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expense, under public supervision and direction,
and without charge, (B) meet the standards of
the State educational agency, (C) include an
appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary
school education in the State involved, and (D)
are
provided
in
conformity
with
the
individualized education program required under
section 1414(a) (5) of this title.
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other
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for
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The courts below concluded it was

more

specific

guidance

than

the
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provisions of the Act itself - as to the meaning of "free
appropriate public education".

The District Court, and a

divided panel of the Court of Appeals, concluded that a
state is required

to provide for each handicapped child

"an

to

opportunity

commensurate
children."

with
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that

the

standard approved below would confuse, rather than afford
any more definitive guidance than the Act itself.
This Court also has undertaken, in its opinion today,
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3.

to state what Congress meant by an "appropriate" education
for each handicapped child.

It agrees that the definition

or standard articulated by the courts below is "unworkable
requiring
Ante at 21.

impossible measurements and comparsions."
55

The Court then states its own view:

"Implicit in the congressional purpose of
providing access to a • free appropriate public
edcation• is the requirement that the education
to which access is provided be sufficient to
confer
some
educational
benefit
upon
the
handicapped child".
Ante at 23.
(Emphasis
added)

The
required
children,

Court
"to

correctly
educate

from

the

a

emphasizes

that

wide-spectrum

marginally

a

of

state

is

handicapped
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to
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It is clear that the

benefits obtainable by children at one end of the spectrum
will differ dramatically from those obtainable by children
at the other end, with "infinite variations in between."
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I therefore conclude that we need not go beyond the
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key

word
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"appropriate" affords no less guidance than "reasonable",
a term familiar to legislators, administrators, boards and
agencies -

as well as courts.

Indeed,

I think we would

create confusion by trying to read more into "appropriate"
than we do
could

into "reasonable".
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I

join Parts I,

and the judgment.

II and IVB of the Court's

,£t )> ;

a a z:::wS,.::,

~

opinion~
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE

w ...

J . BRENNAN, JR .

RE:

June 3, 1982

No. 80-1002 Board of Education, etc. v. Roxley

Dear Byron:
P1eas.e join me.
Sincerely,

l'

/~

.!

'

j,;At i

.

I

•

Justice White
cc: The Conference

<!Ja-url nf tlft ~ni:tdt .%lhrlt5
~mTlfittgitm.'tB. <!J. 2DpJ!.~

.;§u:putttt
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 4, 1982

I·

Re:

80-1002 - Board of Education v. Rowley

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Respectfully ,

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

<!fourl of t4t ~~ .;§taft5
~rutftinghtn.l{). <!f. 2ll~'!.;l

.:§nprtntt

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

June 7, 1982

Re:

80-1002 - Board of Education of the Hendrick
Hudson Central School District v. Rowley

Dear Bill:
I join.

j.

Regards,

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

'•.

lfp/ss 06/09/82
80-1002 Board of Education v. Rowley
Memo to file:
Although

I

would prefer to write this case along

the lines of my draft opinion of June 3 (see draft in file) ,
WHR - after he and
his opinion.
I

vote.

I

talked - has made helpful changes in

See drafts Nos. 2 and 3.
am not sure Bill can obtain a Court without my

Therefore, in the interest of putting a Court

together,

I

am joining his opinion.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

.June 9, 198 2

80-1002 Board of Education v. Rowley

Dear Bill:
Please ;oin me.
Sincerely,

Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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